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<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/2/177?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Global Governance Organizations: Legitimacy and Authority in Conflict]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/2/177?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Global governance organizations (GGOs) are frequently maligned as both illegitimate and ineffective. With the growing prominence of entities that promulgate global rules governing trade, communications, finance, and transport, these shortcomings take on greater importance. This essay presents a theoretical framework to understand the challenge of legitimacy for GGOs. It argues that GGOs tend to face trade-offs between legitimacy and authority, but that widespread usages of these important terms conflate or confuse them and thus obscure critical issues in GGO politics. Once these terms are more clearly defined, we see more easily that GGOs must sometimes violate democratic norms, sacrificing equality and bureaucratic neutrality, to satisfy key constituencies and thus retain power. The argument lays the foundation for an empirical study that demonstrates how the structure and processes adopted by GGOs are intended to satisfy the conflicting demands of legitimacy and authority.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Koppell, J. G. S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-06</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mum041</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Global Governance Organizations: Legitimacy and Authority in Conflict]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>203</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>177</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/2/205?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Ties that Bind: Social Networks, Person-Organization Value Fit, and Turnover Intention]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/2/205?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This article examines the influence of social networks and value congruence on turnover intention among public and nonprofit employees. We argue that employees exist in social networks inside and outside their organization, and these networks shape employee attitudes and behavior. To illustrate this theory, we use turnover intention. A strong and positive intraorganizational social network characterized by good relations with and a sense of obligation toward other staff is hypothesized to make it more likely that employees will stay. A strong social network external to the organization is hypothesized to increase the opportunities that employees have to leave. Our findings offer strong support for the role of intraorganizational networks, but relatively weak support for the effect of external networks. We also propose that person-organization (P-O) fit shape turnover intention. Our results suggest that employees who experience a strong P-O fit in terms of value congruence are more likely to offer a long-term commitment.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Moynihan, D. P., Pandey, S. K.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-06</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mum013</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Ties that Bind: Social Networks, Person-Organization Value Fit, and Turnover Intention]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>227</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>205</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/2/229?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/2/229?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This article examines the governance of organizational networks and the impact of governance on network effectiveness. Three basic models, or forms, of network governance are developed focusing on their distinct structural properties. Propositions are formulated examining conditions for the effectiveness of each form. The tensions inherent in each form are then discussed, followed by the role that management may play in addressing these tensions. Finally, the evolution of governance is explored.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Provan, K. G., Kenis, P.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-06</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mum015</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>252</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>229</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/2/253?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Serpents in the Sand: Managerial Networking and Nonlinear Influences on Organizational Performance]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/2/253?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Scholars of public management have consistently found that management matters, but little research has considered how much management matters or whether the link between management and performance may be contingent on various factors. This article further investigates the link between management and performance by examining the functional form of the relationship. Analyses using data from 1000+ public organizations point to some diminishing returns. Results suggest that networking with other organizations might not always result in gains for the organization. Findings also show how managerial quality and differences in organizational staff can affect this relationship.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hicklin, A., O'Toole, L. J., Meier, K. J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-06</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mum009</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Serpents in the Sand: Managerial Networking and Nonlinear Influences on Organizational Performance]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>273</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>253</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/2/275?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Costs of Speaking Truth to Power: How Professionalism Facilitates Credible Communication]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/2/275?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This article examines how information or policy analysis can be credibly communicated between the bureaucracy and Congress. To investigate this issue, I develop a signaling model which shows that under certain circumstances&mdash;specifically when professionalized bureaucrats can impose observable costs on themselves that their politically inclined counterparts are unwilling to incur&mdash;credible communication between the bureaucracy and Congress is possible. A contribution of this article is that it provides a theoretical underpinning for the importance of professionalism and neutral competence in the bureaucracy as a means of promoting good governance.<qd><p>A promise underlies public policy: if the actions we recommend are undertaken, good ... consequences rather than bad ... ones actually will come about. (<cross-ref type="bib" refid="bib32">Wildavsky 1979</cross-ref>, 35)</p>
<p>The "political master" finds himself in the position of the "dilettante" who stands opposite the "expert," facing the trained official who stands within the management of administration. (Weber, as quoted in <cross-ref type="bib" refid="bib35">Gerth and Mills 1958</cross-ref>, 232).</p>
</qd></p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tonon, J. M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-06</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mum011</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Costs of Speaking Truth to Power: How Professionalism Facilitates Credible Communication]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>295</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>275</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/2/297?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Factors behind Organizational Learning from Benchmarking: Experiences from Norwegian Municipal Benchmarking Networks]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/2/297?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Benchmarking rests on the assumption that it supports organizational learning and innovation, but the empirical knowledge that underpins this perceived means-end relationship is limited. This article draws on existing research to develop a framework for analyzing organizational learning outcomes from municipal benchmarking. The framework incorporates explanatory factors at different levels (network and municipality), and with different time perspectives (past and present). Empirical results from a nationwide Norwegian benchmarking project indicate that municipalities do obtain organizational learning from benchmarking but that care must be taken when organizational learning is conceptualized and assessed. Learning should incorporate aiding agenda setting and decision making, as well as changes. Factors such as network and administrative characteristics and management and political participation are found to influence learning outcomes. There are also indications that learning from benchmarking is subject to politics. Notably, nonsocialist political regimes are less receptive to organizational learning than other regimes and political competition enhances organizational learning from benchmarking.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Askim, J., Johnsen, A., Christophersen, K.-A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-06</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mum012</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Factors behind Organizational Learning from Benchmarking: Experiences from Norwegian Municipal Benchmarking Networks]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>320</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>297</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/2/321?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Regulator Attitudes and the Environmental Race to the Bottom Argument]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/2/321?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Concerns that interstate economic competition will lead states to relax their environmental regulation, potentially resulting in a race to the bottom, remain commonplace in both academic and public policy debates about state environmental policy. Most of the existing empirical work examining the race to the bottom argument tests the behavioral predictions of the argument. In this article, I focus on the attitudinal predictions. Specifically, I examine whether state regulators express beliefs consistent with what we would expect to observe if a race to the bottom dynamic operates within state regulatory decision making. Studying data from the State Environmental Managers Survey, I find that state regulators are sensitive to the effects that their regulatory decisions have on industry investment decisions and that their agencies are influenced by the regulatory decision making of economic competitor states.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Konisky, D. M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-06</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mum018</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Regulator Attitudes and the Environmental Race to the Bottom Argument]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>344</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>321</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/2/345?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Enigmatic Bureaucracy-Democracy Nexus]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/2/345?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Balla, S. J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-06</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mun003</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Enigmatic Bureaucracy-Democracy Nexus]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>347</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-04-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>345</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Book Review</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/1/1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Multisectoral Trilemma of Network Management]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/1/1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This article presents an analysis of different network coordination strategies. The article extends network management scholarship by integrating sector-based differences within a theoretical framework encompassing extant conceptions of network management. Even as the emergent field of network management scholarship advances, current research tends to generalize network management approaches based on assumptions that organizations behave similarly within a network regardless of whether the organizations are governmental, nonprofit, or commercial. Consequently, existing research does not fully account for whether sector-based differences have implications for network management. This article provides evidence that sector-based differences within a network matter because the differences provide strategic opportunities and constraints for managers involved in coordinating mixed-sector networks. This article makes several contributions to network management scholarship. First, this article provides a framework that reviews and situates current conceptions about network coordination within a passive-to-active continuum of managerial approaches. Sectoral differences are situated and integrated within this framework. Second, this article provides an empirically based investigation of a quasi-natural experiment that examines sector-based differences in mixed-sector workforce development networks in Boston. The article's findings suggest that integrating sector-based orientations within a passive-to-active network managerial continuum helps clarify and categorize the strategic options and trade-offs that managers may consider in coordinating multisectoral networks.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Herranz, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mum004</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Multisectoral Trilemma of Network Management]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>31</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>1</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/1/33?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Political Control and Bureaucratic Autonomy Revisited: A Multi-Institutional Analysis of OSHA Enforcement]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/1/33?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>The proper role of bureaucracy in democratic governance has long been a matter of controversy. One part of the debate involves the argument that democratic control and bureaucratic autonomy are dichotomous opposites: if there is democratic control, there cannot be bureaucratic autonomy, and vice versa. This article develops a spatial model of bureaucratic policy choices that reveals that conditions of democratic control and bureaucratic autonomy are not incompatible: the interactions among political institutions not only create the condition in which government agencies must respond to the will of the elected officials but also provide the opportunity for the agencies to reflect their own preferences in policy outcomes. Empirical analyses of occupational safety and health enforcement between 1982 and 2000 provide support for the general argument that bureaucratic responsiveness and bureaucratic autonomy together constitute the behavioral characteristics of bureaucracy under institutional influence.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kim, D.-R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mum003</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Political Control and Bureaucratic Autonomy Revisited: A Multi-Institutional Analysis of OSHA Enforcement]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>55</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>33</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/1/57?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Public Complacency under Repeated Emergency Threats: Some Empirical Evidence]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/1/57?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>In the summer of 2004, the state of Florida was struck by four major hurricanes consecutively. Using data collected from jurisdictions experiencing hurricanes, this study examines public complacency defined as the tendency to ignore hurricane threat warnings. Results indicate that the public showed signs of complacency under repeated emergency threat warnings and there is a need to manage or reduce such tendency because a complacent public is less prepared for emergencies. Importantly, the study finds that the government plays a role in developing effective communication strategies to reduce public complacency and to enhance public preparedness in response to disasters.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Wang, X., Kapucu, N.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mum001</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Public Complacency under Repeated Emergency Threats: Some Empirical Evidence]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>78</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>57</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/1/79?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Public Sector Management and the Democratic Ethos: A 5-Year Study of Key Relationships in Israel]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/1/79?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This article deals with the nexus between bureaucracy and democracy in a management-oriented public sector. The article develops the idea that public administration plays a major role in determining citizens&rsquo; political attitudes and behaviors. A theoretical model is suggested to examine the relationship among citizens&rsquo; perceptions of involvement and participation in administrative decision making, perceived managerial quality, perceived public sector performance, and democratic participatory behavior (i.e., trust in administrative agencies, political participation, and community involvement). A sample of 2,281 Israeli citizens provided information on the research variables over a 5-year period (2001&ndash;05). Findings reveal that citizens&rsquo; perceptions of involvement and participation in administrative decision making are positively related with perceived managerial quality but are not related with perceived public sector performance. In addition, perceived managerial quality is positively related with trust in administrative agencies as well as with political participation and community involvement. Finally, public sector performance is a mediator in this relationship. These findings lead to a discussion about the linkage between the bureaucratic and the democratic ethos in modern managerial governance, theoretical and practical implications, as well as suggestions for future studies.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Vigoda-Gadot, E., Mizrahi, S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mum002</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Public Sector Management and the Democratic Ethos: A 5-Year Study of Key Relationships in Israel]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>107</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>79</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/1/109?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Urban E-Government Initiatives and Environmental Decision Performance in Korea]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/1/109?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Although e-government initiatives have been credited as engines of government reform, empirical evidence is insufficient to determine their effects on public sector performance. To explore the impact of e-government on local governance, this article examines how e-government initiatives influence the perceived performance of environmental decision making in an urban context and what organizational and contextual factors affect Web-aided decision performance. Data were collected from the content analysis of city government Web sites and a nationwide survey of city officials in Korea. Findings from path analysis show that (1) information technology leadership of senior management and Web site quality are key to decision intelligence, quality, and speed and (2) e-government Web divide, a gap in the capability of city Web sites to support public service delivery and democratic interaction, translates into disparities in environmental decision performance across cities. Additionally, environmental activism is a significant factor shaping the impact of e-government on environmental decision making. E-government initiatives contribute to local governance performance, but their impacts vary, depending on Web site quality and the entrepreneurial leadership of public managers.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lim, J. H., Tang, S.-Y.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mum005</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Urban E-Government Initiatives and Environmental Decision Performance in Korea]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>138</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>109</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/1/139?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Case for Countercyclical Fiscal Capacity]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/1/139?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>A growing literature has sought to demonstrate when and how government capacity links to performance. This article examines those questions in the area of financial management. A basic challenge for state governments is to maintain budgetary stability and program predictability in face of economic downturns. State governments can best meet this challenge by developing what we call countercyclical fiscal capacity (CCFC). We present the concept of CCFC as the creation and use of financial tools that help state governments maintain countercyclical spending and program stability during revenue shocks. We operationalize the concept in terms of fiscal reserves that are used to mitigate emergency-spending cuts and tax increases and analyze the operation of such reserves over a period that includes recessions in 1991 and 2001. We find evidence of the efficacy of CCFC and argue for greater investments in this aspect of government capacity.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hou, Y., Moynihan, D. P.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mum006</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Case for Countercyclical Fiscal Capacity]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>159</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>139</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/1/161?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Accountability Agreements in Ontario Hospitals: Are They Fair?]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/1/161?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Governments can be accountable for improving the fairness of their priority setting through enhanced transparency and stakeholder engagement. A case analysis is conducted of priority setting in a government health care context in Ontario, Canada, assessing how implementation of hospital accountability agreements meets the conditions of a leading international ethical framework for priority setting, "accountability for reasonableness" (A4R). Hospital accountability agreements provide a mechanism for government to ensure that public funding achieves desired performance in hospitals. A key goal of priority setting is fairness. A4R links priority setting, legitimacy, and fairness to theories of democratic deliberation, making a claim for fairness if the four conditions of relevance, publicity, revision/appeals, and enforcement are satisfied. Regarding the relevance condition, this analysis suggests that government only partially met the relevance condition providing limited stakeholder engagement but with evidence of policy learning and movement toward the establishment of inclusive stakeholder arrangements. Evidence suggests that government eventually progressed toward meeting the publicity condition. Government only partially met the revision/appeals condition and did not meet the enforcement condition, as the other conditions were only partially met. It is our view that regional governance structures in Ontario (i.e., Local Health Integration Networks or LHINs) provide an opportunity for the province to improve the fairness of their accountability agreement processes through enhancing transparency and stakeholder engagement. More broadly, this case study provides a guide for government to enhance accountability by focusing on A4R to improve the fairness of its priority setting.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Reeleder, D., Goel, V., Singer, P. A., Martin, D. K.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-12-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mul024</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Accountability Agreements in Ontario Hospitals: Are They Fair?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>175</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>161</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/4/535?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Procedural Control of the Bureaucracy, Peer Review, and Epistemic Drift]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/4/535?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Regulatory peer review&mdash;in which independent scientists comment on the technical underpinnings of proposed regulations&mdash;is a recently pursued form of political control of the bureaucracy. This article situates regulatory peer review in the context of both the history of technical advice to government and the principal-agent perspective often used to explain the presence of administrative procedures. Much of the academic discussion of attempts to influence bureaucratic decision making has utilized principal-agent theory. We introduce two novel concepts to accommodate regulatory peer review into the principal-agent framework. The first is "technocracy" where the preferences of technical experts displace public preferences. The second is "epistemic drift," a change in embodied knowledge that contributes to departures from the policy intentions of an enacting coalition of policy makers. In addition to introducing these concepts, we argue that regulatory peer review is more complex than other administrative procedures and that its efficacy critically depends on the details of its implementation. We hypothesize that regulatory peer review will cause nongovernmental participants in regulatory conflicts to devote more effort to creating research and other epistemic resources. But we also hypothesize that, just as courts have become more politicized with their role in regulatory policy, peer review and regulatory science will become increasingly politicized as well.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Shapiro, S., Guston, D.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-09-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mul026</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Procedural Control of the Bureaucracy, Peer Review, and Epistemic Drift]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>551</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-10-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>535</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/4/553?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Intraorganizational Implementation Research: Theory and Method]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/4/553?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>The article presents a process by which qualitative case study implementation research may be cumulated. Using the concept of the <I>hermeneutic spiral</I>, an iterative process is employed in order to increase understanding of welfare implementation since the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. This process involves a review of recent welfare reform literature, the use of the knowing organization model (KOM) as a research frame for understanding the existing literature and the application of the KOM to primary data collected from county welfare offices in Pennsylvania.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mischen, P. A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-09-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mul027</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Intraorganizational Implementation Research: Theory and Method]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>566</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-10-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>553</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/4/567?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Public Management at the Ballot Box: Performance Information and Electoral Support for Incumbent English Local Governments]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/4/567?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Publishing performance information about local public services, an increasing trend in many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries, matters politically because it has an effect on incumbent local governments' electoral support. Voters are able to use performance information to punish or reward incumbents in the elections that follow their publication, which may fill a gap in the chain of accountability between voters and governments. We model the introduction of published Comprehensive Performance Assessments of local authorities in England, which make summary information about performance available to voters, as a "shock" to the relationship between voters and incumbents. Controlling for an unpublicized measure of performance change over time, change in the local tax level, change in local economic conditions, and whether the local incumbent is the party of the incumbent government at the national level, we find negativity bias. Incumbents in local authorities in the "poor" performance category experience a substantial reduction in aggregate vote share at the election following publication, but there is no similarly sized reward for those in the highest performance category.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[James, O., John, P.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-09-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mul020</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Public Management at the Ballot Box: Performance Information and Electoral Support for Incumbent English Local Governments]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>580</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-10-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>567</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/4/581?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Knowledge Sharing in Public Sector Organizations: The Effect of Organizational Characteristics on Interdepartmental Knowledge Sharing]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/4/581?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Public sector organizations are mainly knowledge-intensive organizations, and to exploit their knowledge, effective knowledge sharing among the different departments is required. We focus on specific characteristics of public sector organizations that increase or limit interdepartmental knowledge sharing. Three types of organization-specific coordination mechanisms directly influence knowledge sharing between departments. Organizations are also characterized by members' social identification and trust, which in the absence of power games are assumed to create a knowledge-sharing context. Data are collected by a questionnaire survey in the public sector. The sample consists of 358 cooperative episodes between departments in more than 90 different public sector organizations. Structural equation modeling reveals the importance of lateral coordination and trust. The combination of power games and informal coordination seems to be remarkably beneficial for knowledge sharing. Furthermore, compared with other public sector organizations, government institutions have organizational characteristics that are less beneficial for knowledge sharing.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Willem, A., Buelens, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-09-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mul021</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Knowledge Sharing in Public Sector Organizations: The Effect of Organizational Characteristics on Interdepartmental Knowledge Sharing]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>606</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-10-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>581</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/4/607?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Supreme Court Auditing of the US Courts of Appeals: An Organizational Perspective]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/4/607?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Using an aggregate-level model of Supreme Court&ndash;circuit court interactions, this study assesses the extent to which the Court's auditing process of circuit court outputs is shaped by organizational dynamics such as structural capacity, institutionalization, and demographic characteristics. Principals in organizational hierarchies must audit the behavior of their agents to ensure that the agents are faithfully complying with the principals' preferences. In the case of the Supreme Court, such auditing activities must take place in the face of very limited institutional capacity on the Court's part. We propose that the Court considers certain broad organizational and institutional characteristics at the circuit level when performing this task. In particular, we find that the Court strategically allocates its limited institutional resources to audit decisions to respond to its recent interactions with individual circuits in past terms, the circuits' internal decision-making dynamics (including dissent and reversal rates), and goal conflict between the circuit and the Supreme Court.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lindquist, S. A., Haire, S. B., Songer, D. R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-09-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mul022</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Supreme Court Auditing of the US Courts of Appeals: An Organizational Perspective]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>624</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-10-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>607</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/4/625?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Public Participation and Claimsmaking: Evidence Utilization and Divergent Policy Frames in California's Ergonomics Rulemaking]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/4/625?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Notice and comment provisions in agency rulemaking provide an important mechanism for the public to contribute to policy. Yet there is limited research on how interest groups participate in this process. California's passage of an ergonomics standard in 1997, the only current state statute in the country, provides a useful, high salience policy case for examining public commentary. Between an initially proposed comprehensive standard and the enactment of a much weaker regulation occurred the largest public response in California's state Occupational Safety and Health Administration history. Through a detailed content analysis of the notice and comment submissions we identify features of participation and claimsmaking that differ between business and nonbusiness submissions. Business groups were the large majority of participants and also presented a disproportionate amount of evidence, using an "abstract-technical" policy frame to assert the illegitimacy of the ergonomics standard. Labor, public health organizations and private citizens represented less than one-third of the participants and relied primarily on experiential information and a "concretized-moral" characterization of policy issues in support of the standard. The existence of these distinct "interpretive communities" that mobilize different resources raises questions about whether public commentary can fulfill its purported "democratic accountability" purpose as well as underline the limitations of appealing to scientific expertise for solving complex policy problems.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jewell, C., Bero, L.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-09-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mul023</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Public Participation and Claimsmaking: Evidence Utilization and Divergent Policy Frames in California's Ergonomics Rulemaking]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>650</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-10-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>625</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/4/651?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Explaining Cooperation: How Resource Interdependence, Goal Congruence, and Trust Affect Joint Actions in Policy Implementation]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/4/651?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>A perennial problem when political decisions are to be implemented is how to make authorities work together. Previous research shows that resource interdependence, goal congruence, and mutual trust increase interorganizational cooperation. In this article, it is argued that interaction effects must also be considered in order to fully understand how these variables affect cooperation. The study is based on 203 dyads of Swedish Public Employment Service offices and municipalities in 2003. I find that mutual trust is necessary if goal congruence is to increase cooperation between these agencies. Furthermore, mutual trust only has a positive effect if organizations have similar objectives. However, trust is not required for resource interdependence to affect cooperation, and the effect of trust is not dependent on the organizations' mutual dependence. The results imply that trust and goal congruence must exist simultaneously in order to promote joint actions. Thus, if a management strategy aimed at increasing cooperation only focuses on the organizations' objectives or the level of trust between them, it will fail. An important lesson for future research is that including interaction terms in the analysis improves our understanding of interorganizational cooperation.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lundin, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-09-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mul025</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Explaining Cooperation: How Resource Interdependence, Goal Congruence, and Trust Affect Joint Actions in Policy Implementation]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>672</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-10-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>651</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/4/673?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[A Challenging Performance]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/4/673?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hatry, H. P.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-09-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mum014</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[A Challenging Performance]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>677</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-10-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>673</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Book Reviews</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/4/677?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[A Corrupt Argument]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/4/677?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Holley, M., Carr, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-09-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mum016</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[A Corrupt Argument]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>679</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-10-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>677</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Book Reviews</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/4/680?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Managing to Measure]]></title>
<link>http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/4/680?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Radin, B. A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-09-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jopart/mum017</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Managing to Measure]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Public Management Research Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>682</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-10-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>680</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Book Reviews</prism:section>
</item>

</rdf:RDF>