

The Impact of Red Tape on Governmental Performance: An Empirical Analysis

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the impact of red tape on governmental performance in the context of English local government. Both the red tape and performance constructs are multidimensional, so relationships between the concepts and their several dimensions are examined in detail. The results show that different types of red tape have varying impacts on governmental performance but that these effects are somewhat weaker than public management theory and conventional wisdom suggest. Moreover, some types of red tape affect some dimensions of performance in surprising ways. For example, internal red tape has limited effects on efficiency but inflicts considerable damage on equity. The results also show that red tape is a subject-dependent concept—known in the literature as stakeholder red tape. We contend that this alternative conceptualization of red tape opens new vistas for understanding the concept and should be explored further. The implications for public management research and practice are discussed.

This study addresses one of the most important questions in public management research and practice. What impact, if any, does red tape have on governmental performance? Of the several bureaucratic maladies that have attained mythical stature over the years, red tape is, perhaps, the most pervasive and damaging overall.¹ This is because red tape is assumed to make public organizations more arthritic and self-serving, less able to achieve their core missions, and less responsive to overhead political authorities and service users.

Most observers agree that red tape lowers governmental performance, but very few empirical studies have examined the nature and strength of this alleged relationship (for partial exceptions, see Brewer 2006; Brewer and Selden 2000; Pandey and Moynihan 2006; Walker and Brewer, forthcoming). Although these studies generally show that red tape lowers performance, their results are not conclusive. Most of the studies utilize

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¹ These maladies include red tape, goal ambiguity, redundancy, corruption, and bureaucratic imperialism among others (Rainey 2003; Wilson 1989).

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weak, single-dimensional measures of red tape and/or performance—although both are multidimensional constructs. As a result, these studies do not probe the relationship between dimensions of red tape and performance. We do not know, for example, how internal red tape affects the performance dimensions of efficiency and equity. Clearly, a finer-grained analysis is needed. Such an analysis would help clarify the impact of red tape on performance, and it might produce some interesting findings on the relationship between the constructs' dimensions. As Kaufman (1977) provocatively suggested, red tape may even be beneficial at times (but see Bozeman 1993 and 2000, who seems to reject this notion).

The dearth of research on the red tape-performance hypothesis is surprising because the purported relationship between these constructs is central to public management theory and practice. Maintaining high levels of governmental performance is obviously very important to society at large. Yet governmental performance seems more complex, constrained, and fragile than performance in the business and nonprofit sectors. This is in part because government agencies are assumed to have more red tape than business firms and nonprofit organizations (Rainey 2003; Wilson 1989). As a result, efforts to reduce red tape often form the spearhead of popular reform movements (e.g., Blair 2002; Gore 1993; Office of Public Sector Reform [OPSR] 2002). The effect of red tape on governmental performance is, therefore, crucial to understand because such knowledge can be used for public service improvement and the betterment of society.

One major contribution of this study is that we take into account the multidimensional nature of red tape and performance. We first examine the relationship between the aggregate constructs of red tape and performance. Then the relationships between their dimensions are examined. For example, we examine whether internal red tape results in quality and efficiency losses in public agencies, and whether external red tape lowers customer satisfaction and perceptions of value for money. In addition, we examine the effects of several personnel and administrative subsystem measures of red tape concerned with rewards and responsiveness, which are thought to be especially damaging to performance. Our second major contribution is to present evidence showing that red tape is a subject-dependent concept consistent with Bozeman's (2000) formulation of stakeholder red tape. We show the utility of this alternative theoretical framework in our concluding discussion.

The next section reviews some of the literature on red tape and governmental performance and sketches out our main research questions. Subsequent sections describe the context of the study—English local government—and the data set and methods that will be employed to answer the research questions. The findings are then reported and the implications for public management research and practice are discussed.

PRIOR EVIDENCE ON RED TAPE AND GOVERNMENTAL PERFORMANCE

Red tape is universally seen as something problematic that must be overcome. In fact, the concept seems fundamentally based on the notion that it has corrosive effects on governmental performance. Bozeman's (2000, 12) widely cited definition of red tape captures the essence of the concept and illustrates this view of its harmful nature: "rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance burden but [do] not advance the legitimate purposes the rules were intended to serve." Several other definitions and operationalizations of red tape have been employed in previous research, but they too are

predicated on the belief that red tape has negative effects—especially on the lives of public servants and citizens and on governmental performance.²

These presumptions about red tape are seen around the globe, both in the actions of individual countries and international organizations such as the OECD, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank. Together, these organizations regularly report on the problems of red tape, both relative to its association with corruption, loss of transparency, and reduced levels of trust in government, or through case study examples of its divisive and harmful effects within particular countries or policy sectors (e.g., Center for International Private Enterprise 2001; OECD 2001, 2003).

In the United States, the term red tape has been used to denote formalization, structural complexity, burgeoning paperwork, excessive or dysfunctional rules, and task delays. Attempts to eliminate red tape date back to the late 1970s (Kaufman 1977; US Office of Management and Budget 1979). These attempts have intensified in recent years and are now a central plank in governmental reform efforts for both Democrats and Republicans (Gore 1993; Richardson and Ziebart 1994; US Office of Management and Budget 2001). The political left proposes to combat red tape by decentralizing the public service, empowering public employees, and instilling an entrepreneurial spirit in government (Gore 1993; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). The political right, in contrast, offers a harsher set of remedies that includes wholesale deregulation of business and increased contracting and privatization of public services (Heritage Foundation 2005; US Office of Management and Budget 2001).

In the United Kingdom—the site of our study—red tape was previously the preserve of the Conservative Party which sought to “roll back the state” and introduce market mechanisms and streamlined processes (Walsh 1995). More recently, this agenda has been exploited by the Labour Party, which has made public service improvement a central facet of its domestic policy agenda. A key aspect of this reform program is the perceived necessity to cut red tape: “More effort is needed to cut back further on red tape, which steals valuable time from doctors, nurses, teachers, the police and other public servants” (OPSR 2002, 18). To further this aim, the Labour administration established the Better Regulation Executive (BRE) in the Cabinet Office soon after taking office in 1997. The BRE aims for reductions in red tape within public organizations: “The BREs Public Sector Team works closely with the five key delivery areas within the public sector (health, education, criminal justice, local government, and transportation) to understand and minimize unnecessary bureaucracy, or ‘red-tape’ that prevents front-line staff from carrying out their core duties” (BRE 2005). Similarly, the BRE seeks to ease the burden of external red tape—or regulation—by reducing the regulatory requirements government places on business.

Former Prime Minister Blair was explicit about the need to reduce “. . . bureaucratic demarcations, restrictive practices and red tape” (OPSR 2002, 18) in the delivery of local government services. To resolve the problem of red tape, local governments (the unit of analysis in our study) are encouraged to innovate and find new ways to respond to customer demands. Reductions in red tape are expected to boost governmental performance. For

2 For example, red tape has been defined and operationalized as excessive business regulation (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2001), administrative complexity (OECD 2003), excessive paperwork (US Office of Management and Budget 1979), excessive rules and task delays (Bozeman, Reed, and Scott 1992), over formalization (Bozeman and Scott 1996), personnel system constraints (Rainey, Pandey, and Bozeman 1995; Brewer 2006), and bureaucratic largesse (Brewer and Selden 2000).

example, the OPSR (2002, 19) describes the effects of lowered red tape in schools as follows:

Classroom assistants are allowing teachers to concentrate on education in the classroom. Bursars help heads concentrate on leading their schools. Their introduction enables schools and their pupils to get the best out of staff, allowing a greater focus on teaching and lesson preparation.

Very few empirical studies have examined the relationship between red tape and governmental performance or between the constructs' dimensions (for partial exceptions, see Brewer 2006; Brewer and Selden 2000; Pandey and Moynihan 2006; Walker and Brewer, forthcoming). The majority of evidence to date, whether drawn from rigorously designed academic studies or casual observations from politicians, policymakers and service users, suggests that red tape is uniformly bad for governmental performance. Indeed, it is possible to extend this prediction to the construct dimension level and conclude that any type of red tape is bad for any type of performance. Evidence, however, demonstrates that many organizational characteristics and management practices have varying effects on the several dimensions of performance (Cotton et al. 1988). For example, studies have shown that both organizational structure and management strategy exert different impacts on performance (Andrews et al. 2007; Meier et al. 2007; O'Toole and Meier 1999). We might, therefore, similarly expect to find varying relationships between the different types of red tape and the several dimensions of performance. Thus, two central research questions are addressed in this study: (1) what effects, if any, does red tape have on governmental performance and (2) do these effects vary across the constructs' dimensions?

We try to improve on prior studies of red tape in several ways. First, we draw upon previously used measures of red tape and also examine some new global measures of the construct, thus capturing its multidimensional nature. Second, we tap the multidimensional nature of governmental performance as well, utilizing a well-defined and carefully proofed measure that consists of nine dimensions derived from both internal and external perceptions of the construct. Third, we address the research questions listed above by analyzing data from a large-scale survey of English local government managers. Fourth, these data are collected from multiple informants in each authority, thus providing a robust set of managerial perceptions. Fifth, by focusing on English local government, this study also benefits from good secondary data sources.

DATA AND METHODS

Unit of Analysis

This study is situated in the English local government sector. English local governments are politically elected bodies with a Westminster style cabinet system of political management. They are multipurpose authorities delivering education, social services, regulatory services (such as land use planning), housing, libraries, leisure services, and welfare benefits in specific geographical areas. London boroughs, metropolitan boroughs and unitary authorities deliver all of these services in urban areas. In rural areas, a two-tier system prevails with county councils administering education and social services and district councils providing environmental and welfare services, while some regulatory functions such as land use planning are shared. In the two-tier system, county councils' expenditure is around three times that of district councils, given their delivery of education and social services. In many cases, district councils have outsourced services, such as public housing provision

and management and leisure services and, thus, have limited involvement. Authorities are multipurpose but not all-purpose (e.g., health care is provided by separate health authorities), employ professional career staff, and receive approximately two-thirds of their revenue and guidance on implementing legislation from the central government.

Data Sources

Data for this study are drawn from three sources: a survey of managers in English local government, the Audit Commission (local government's regulator), and the UK Census. From the Audit Commission (2002), we take a performance measure called Core Service Performance (CSP). The UK Census, in turn, provides several measures of external constraints which serve as control variables in our analyses. Our principal source of data is the survey, which provides perceptual measures of red tape, organization, management, and performance. The survey is described in more detail below.

Survey data are taken from an electronic survey of English local authorities that explored informants' perceptions of organization, management, and performance.³ Within each local authority, we collected data from multiple informants at the corporate and service levels.⁴ This strategy was adopted to address the weakness of prior studies that have relied on elite surveys, which typically collect evidence on organizational leaders' aspirations rather than actual organizational practices and overlook the range of different perceptions within organizations (Bowman and Ambrosini 1997; Brewer 2006; Walker and Enticott 2004). Corporate officers and service managers were selected because research has shown that attitudes differ between hierarchical levels within organizations (Aiken and Hage 1968; Brewer 2005; Walker and Enticott 2004). All survey questions were in the form of a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = disagree to 7 = agree), and informants were asked to rate their authority (for corporate respondents) or service (for chief officers and service managers) on different dimensions of red tape and management. By calculating an organizational mean from the means of corporate officers and service officers, variations across organizations are maintained and categorical measures are converted to continuous ones.

At the core of the survey is a representative sample of 100 English local authorities. Representativeness is based upon background variables including deprivation, population, and performance (see Martin et al. 2003). The survey was conducted annually from 2001 to 2004. The 2004 survey was administered to 175 authorities (the 100 representative authorities plus all other upper tier councils) and responses were received from 166 authorities—a response rate of 95%. This included some 1,232 officers. Analysis is undertaken on the 136 upper-tier authorities that replied to the survey and provided full data.⁵

3 The survey was conducted by e-mail following a pilot in 17 local authorities that tested the survey administration technique and item quality (Enticott 2003). E-mail addresses were collected from authorities and questionnaires delivered as an Excel file attached to an e-mail. The electronic questionnaires were self-coding. Informants had 8 weeks to answer the questions and return the file by e-mail. During the survey period, three reminders were sent to informants who had not yet responded. A copy of the full questionnaire is available upon request from the authors.

4 Corporate services were surveyed along with seven other core services: education, social care, land use planning, waste management, housing, library and leisure, and benefits. Questionnaires were distributed to three corporate informants and the chief officer and three managers in each core service.

5 District councils are excluded from our analysis because they do not have an external measure of performance. Analysis is therefore undertaken on what are typically large-scale, multipurpose organizations. Although this reduces the sample size, analysis shows that district councils are different on a number of important measures, including budget, size, and a range of management practices (Martin et al. 2003).

Models are run on the best possible data. Our analysis is cross-sectional when the dependent variable is staff's perceptions of performance and the independent variables come from measures of management taken from the survey. In the CSP model, which features an external measure of performance that is more objective in nature, there is a time lag between the independent and dependent variables. The survey was conducted in the summer of 2004 and asked informants to report on the period April 2003 to April 2004, and the CSP data were collected in December 2004. We are thus able to set time order in the latter model, which is a prerequisite for causal attribution.

Measurement

Measurement is a central concern for the developing field of public management (Boyne et al. 2005). In order to achieve high levels of content validity, measures used in the survey were, where possible, adopted from measures used by other researchers and pilot tested. Below we discuss the dependent variable—governmental performance—followed by red tape and the measures of management, resources, oversight, and context.

Performance

Two central issues have become clear in the long-running debate on the best way to measure governmental performance (Kelly and Swindell 2002; Ostrom 1973; Parks 1984). First, performance is a multidimensional construct that covers many concerns such as quality, efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, and equity (for a review of this literature, see Boyne 2002; Carter, Klein, and Day 1992). These different dimensions are increasingly accepted in the public management literature. Second, perspectives on what constitutes high levels of governmental performance are likely to vary across stakeholder groups (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006b; Brewer 2005, 2006; Walker and Boyne 2006). Key stakeholder groups may be internal or external to the organization. Internal measures of performance are based on the views of stakeholders within an organization, such as senior managers and frontline staff. External measures refer to judgments made by stakeholders in the organization's environment (e.g., voters, regulators and service users). Both sets of measures are perceptual and stem from stakeholders' beliefs about the organization's level of performance relative to similar organizations.

The survey data set contains indicators on multiple dimensions of performance. Although there is a risk of common source bias when using internal perceptual data, access to such a rich set of performance measures is critical to understanding the varying impacts of red tape on performance. Furthermore, the perceived superiority of external archival measures has been challenged, notably because of evidence on cheating (both in the public and private sectors), and evidence that common source bias may not be as extensive as anticipated (Brewer 2006; Spector 2006). We complement these internal stakeholder assessments of performance with those from government's regulator, the Audit Commission, which is considered an external stakeholder.

The Audit Commission (2002) has constructed an external measure of performance for all upper-tier or major English local authorities (London boroughs, metropolitan boroughs, unitary authorities, and county councils). The Commission acts on behalf of central government which is, in turn, the major external stakeholder for local authorities in England. Central government creates and abolishes local government units, provides

approximately 75% of their funding, and bestows or removes service responsibilities. This external measure of performance, known as the “Comprehensive Performance Assessment” (CPA), classifies the performance of authorities into five categories (poor, weak, fair, good, and excellent). The overall CPA scores are derived from external judgments about a local authority’s CSP and its ability to improve, thus incorporating both retrospective and prospective judgments. These two variables are then combined to produce the overall score.

The CSP score covers six dimensions of performance: quantity of outputs, quality of outputs, efficiency, formal effectiveness, value for money, and customer satisfaction. All main areas of local government activity are assessed. In 2005, the Audit Commission gave each service a score varying from 1 (lowest) to 4 (highest). These scores were based largely on archival performance indicators, supplemented by the results of audits and inspections (which are also strongly influenced by performance indicators) and service plans and standards. Although this measure blends archival performance measures with inspectors’ perceptions, all the evaluations are external to the organization.

After calculating the CSP score, the Audit Commission weighted services to reflect their relative importance, as judged by central government and the size of their respective budgets. The weight for education and social services was 4, for environment and housing 2, and for libraries and leisure, benefits, and management of resources 1. The Commission then applied these weights to the performance score (1–4) for each service to calculate the CSP. The resulting score ranges from a minimum of 15 (12 for county councils who do not provide either housing or benefits) to a maximum of 60 (48 for county councils).

We converted these results to an overall performance score that is comparable across all authorities by calculating the percentage of the maximum possible CSP result for the given local government. This produces an “aggregate” measure that combines dimensions of performance and different services, with both retrospective and prospective judgments. This measure is used by local government’s key stakeholder, central government, to bestow rewards (e.g., extra finance and wider discretion), and apply sanctions (e.g., more regulation, replacement of senior managers and externalization of services). In other words, the CSP is a substantially important performance metric in the UK governmental system.

We complement this external measure with more detailed internal measures that allow us to explore more nuanced relationships between red tape and governmental performance. These internal assessments of performance were derived from eight items in our survey of local authority managers (see Table A1 for the measures). Survey respondents were asked to assess, for each of the eight dimensions, the quartile in which their organization was located in relation to other local service providers, with 1 being the bottom and 4 the top. In addition, we include an aggregated internal perceptual measure of governmental performance. This measure is included for comparison to the CSP score and to identify further variations in relationships. The aggregate internal perceptual measure correlates strongly with the CSP score ($r = .64$) (see Table A2 for a correlation matrix of the performance measures).⁶

⁶ It is possible that the respondents are influenced by the central government performance scores. The correlation between internal and the external measures is, however, quite stable over time. Survey responses from 2001 correlated with the 2002 CSP at $r = .69$. The CSP was first calculated in 2002; therefore, the score could not have influenced respondents in 2001. A correlation of nearly .7 is high for alternative measures of performance and suggests that they tap similar dimensions of performance (see Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006b for details).

Red Tape

In the survey, we followed Bozeman (2000) and others' lead by defining red tape as "burdensome rules and procedures that negatively affect performance."⁷ Informants then responded to a battery of questions about different types of red tape. Five measures of red tape were collected and are shown in Table A1. Two are global measures (one each for internal and external red tape),⁸ and three are subsystem measures targeting specific aspects of personnel or administrative red tape (for precedents, see Brewer 2005, 2006; Pandey and Scott 2002; Walker and Brewer 2008).⁹ We combined the measures to form an aggregate index of red tape for our initial runs, then we examined each measure separately as explained below. Although most prior research has combined subsystem measures, we sought to explore the independent impact of each type of red tape on governmental performance. We therefore entered each measure separately into the final regression models. (This proves highly interesting later on because, when kept separate, the two personnel measures often produce opposite results.)¹⁰

Internal and External Control Variables

In general, we included independent variables that were prominent in the red tape and performance literatures. We were limited by the survey questions—most of which were not explicitly designed for this study—and the availability of external archival measures of the social, political, and economic context. All survey measures were recorded on a Likert-type scale (1 = disagree to 7 = agree). Like the red tape measures, they were aggregated at the governmental authority level and converted to continuous data.

Formalization

The UK Labour government's policy literature frequently conflates formalization of bureaucracy with red tape. However, we believe it is important to distinguish between these concepts, particularly because the appropriate use of internal rules, regulations, and procedures can facilitate higher levels of governmental performance. We draw on Subramanian and Nilakanta's (1996) measure of formalization in this study (also see Bozeman and Scott 1996).

Developmental culture

We also include the concept of developmental culture drawn from the red tape literature and other sources. This concept includes measures of innovation and risk taking (Pandey

7 The definition of red tape by Pandey and Kingsley (2000, 782) was also useful in designing this study: "impressions on the part of managers that formalization (in the form of burdensome rules and regulations) is detrimental to the organization." Simply put, red tape exists when managers view formalization as burdensome and detrimental to organizational purposes (Pandey and Scott 2002, 565).

8 Internal red tape refers to bureaucratic rules and routines that negatively affect the internal operations of a public agency. External red tape refers to bureaucratic procedures and regulations that make it difficult for citizens and other stakeholders to interact with the agency or comply with legal mandates. Obviously, these two forms of red tape may work in concert (Walker and Brewer 2008).

9 It can be argued that personnel subsystems are nested within—or possibly overlap—administrative subsystems. However, in the present study, we comport with prior research on red tape and portray them as separate categories given the long pedigree they have in the public management research literature. Some of these items were originally developed by Rainey (1979) and have been used in numerous studies comparing public and private sector management over the years.

10 This measure and the administrative-based red tape measure were reversed for the empirical analysis so that all five measures of red tape would tend in the same direction. In keeping with existing theory and prior empirical evidence, we hypothesize that each type of red tape will have a negative impact on governmental performance.

and Moynihan 2006; Walker and Brewer 2008).¹¹ The notion of developmental culture is cognizant with ongoing policy debate and anecdotal accounts from practice which contend that innovative behavior is a central solution to red tape and can produce higher levels of governmental performance (Blair 2002; OPSR 2002). These policy arguments are supported by empirical evidence that show innovation and related strategies improve governmental performance (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006a; Damanpour and Evan 1984). Another study has shown that political support has a positive impact on performance, both directly and when mediated by developmental culture (Chen and Williams 2007).

Planning

Rational planning and logical incrementalism are the two main models of strategy formulation in the management literature (Elbanna 2006). We use multiple measures to create indexes of these constructs. The measures of rational planning capture the intensive, detailed, and carefully evaluated nature of proposed changes in technology and procedures that take place before action. Also included is a measure of consultation with stakeholders reflecting the strategy-making processes in public organizations (Walker and Boyne 2006) and the political requirements of public sector strategy making in English local government (Blair 2002; OPSR 2002). The second major dimension of strategy-making processes in public agencies is logical incrementalism (Quinn 1980). The following processes associated with logical incrementalism are included in our measures: political processes, bargaining and negotiation, incremental development of processes, and broad goals. Cumulative research on strategy making suggests that rational planning is likely to increase performance, whereas logical incrementalism is likely to reduce it (Boyne 2001; Elbanna 2006).

Resources

Resources are deemed important in the literatures on red tape and governmental performance. Reviewing the performance literature, Boyne (2003) concluded that additional resources are a route to higher levels of governmental performance. Two measures of informants' perceptions on the use of resources are included here: attitudes toward reducing costs in service delivery and whether resource constraints were an important factor in driving improvements within the authority. We focus on perceptions of resources rather than absolute levels because of the relatively high levels of funding from central government (at least two-thirds of local government resources are provided by central government through grants). These resources are allocated by needs-based formulae. Given that both measures explore resource reductions, we anticipate negative relationships with governmental performance.

Oversight

Regulation is expected to have a detrimental effect on governmental performance; it is also hypothesized to increase red tape. Yet red tape is sometimes considered to be a type or form of regulation (Brewer 2006; Center for International Private Enterprise 2001; OECD 2001). Given the importance of regulation to both red tape and governmental performance, we operationalize the concept with two measures and include them in our models. The first variable (regulation) explores the role of inspectors in English local government. The level

¹¹ The four multiitem variables were factor analyzed. The Eigenvalues and percent of variance explained are shown in Table A1. We ran the models with both factor scores and additive indexes but noted very little difference in the results. The factor scores were entered into the multiple regression equations reported here.

of inspection has grown substantially in recent years (Ashworth et al. 2002). Every service included in this analysis has its own inspection service.¹² Inspectors are powerful stakeholders who are able to influence the future strategies and direction of an authority. We therefore questioned informants about the extent to which inspectors' reports influenced their improvement strategies. Consistently, negative ratings can result in central government intervention in local government affairs. This typically occurs when an authority is defined as "failing" in some part of its service delivery or wider accountability activities. A failing organization is subject to a number of punitive measures which have included the replacement of the entire management team or enforced competitive tendering of service delivery. To explore this latter aspect of oversight, we asked about the impact of direct intervention on improvement strategies. Both variables are expected to have detrimental impacts on governmental performance.

External constraints

Three external constraint variables are included in this study. They are archival measures of the environment that focus on service need (including its level, diversity, and the extent to which it has changed). Measures of affluence, such as income data, are not readily available at the local authority level. Hence, the level of service need is operationalized through a measure of lone parent households taken from the 2001 census (Office for National Statistics 2003). This is a proxy measure for the capacity of local residents to co-produce services. Time and money pressures on such households are likely to impede positive contributions to service delivery, requiring additional services and therefore increasing the level of need (Andrews et al. 2005). As the range of users becomes more varied, it becomes harder for local authorities to determine the relative needs of different groups and to provide standardized services that meet their requirements. We use ethnic diversity to measure variations in the level of diversity of service need (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006a). A Herfindahl-Hirschman index was created by squaring the proportion of each ethnic group (taken from the 2001 census, Office for National Statistics 2003) within a local authority and then subtracting the sum of the squares of these proportions from 10,000. The resulting measure is a proxy for "fractionalization" within the local authority area, with a high level of ethnic diversity reflected in a high score on the index. High and diverse levels of need result in lower levels of performance (Andrews et al. 2005; Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006a). The final aspect of service need is population change. Evidence suggests that in areas of rapid population growth, new residents are likely to be economically skilled and socially enterprising (Armstrong and Taylor 2000). Thus, local authorities with growing populations are likely to achieve higher levels of governmental performance.

In addition to these archival measures, we include an index capturing managers' perceptions of their ability to influence the organizational context. This index consists of three important dimensions: ability to influence the socioeconomic, political, and internal political contexts. We anticipate that managers who can manipulate these contexts will achieve higher levels of governmental performance.

¹² Education is inspected by the Office for Standards in Education, social services by the Social Service Inspectorate, benefits and revenues by the Benefits Fraud Inspection Service, and all remaining services, including the corporate centre of a local authority, by the Audit Commission Inspection Service.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

We first created an aggregate index of red tape and estimated its impact on our several measures of governmental performance.¹³ Red tape was negatively and significantly associated with performance in each model—as prior theory and empirical research would predict. However, when we entered additional internal and external control variables in the models, the red tape coefficients lost their strength and statistical significance. This suggests that more fully specified models tend to wash away the effects of red tape when the concept is measured in aggregate form. Another interpretation is that internal management and external constraints can contain the harmful effects of red tape in its aggregate form. Either way, these results confirm the need for more intensive analysis.

Given our premise that red tape and performance are multifaceted concepts, and our belief that their relationship may be more nuanced, we then estimated 10 models. The key results are presented in Table 1. (Full results, including control variables, are available on request from the authors.) Table 1 reports standardized coefficients on the red tape variables and both the standard and adjusted multiple coefficients of determination (the R^2 s and adjusted R^2 s) for the models. All models are statistically significant, and they account for between one-third and two-thirds of the variance in governmental performance, respectively.¹⁴ The internal perceptual models outperform the external perceptual model on five out of nine occasions—evidence that common source bias is limited. (If such bias were present, all internal models should outperform the external model.)

To test whether the red tape items provide any additional explanation beyond the internal and external controls, we computed a Chow F -test (Studenmund 2001; also see Coursey and Bozeman 1990). Table 1 shows that for 7 of the 10 models, the Chow F -tests are significant. This indicates that the red tape variables increase the explanatory power of the models and have real effects on organizational performance in a variety of ways. Where the Chow F -tests are not significant (in the models predicting value for money, efficiency, and customer satisfaction), the red tape coefficients do not attain statistical significance.

Internal and external controls

We first provide a brief discussion of the internal and external controls. Formalization is positively related to performance, but only for effectiveness and staff satisfaction. Developmental culture is a clear predictor of most dimensions of governmental performance except for efficiency. The literature suggests that efficiency is associated with process innovations (see Damanpour and Aravind 2006), so additional research is needed to follow up on this finding. Rational planning is positively associated with internal perceptual measures at the aggregated level of performance and on the dimensions of value for money, efficiency, and effectiveness—which are key aspects of government's production function. Logical incrementalism is associated with several different types of performance: the external aggregate measure (CSP), the internal aggregate measure, quality, and social, economic, and environmental well-being.

¹³ The additive index of red tape has a Cronbach's alpha of .74. The statistical models discussed in this paragraph are not reported in the article but are available on request from the authors.

¹⁴ Multicollinearity is not a problem. The highest VIF score is 2.3, substantially below the threshold level of 10 at which it becomes problematic.

Table 1

The Relationship between red tape and different measures or dimensions of governmental performance

	External			Internal						
	CSP	Aggregate	Quality	Value for money	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Equity	Customer Satisfaction	Staff Satisfaction	Social economic and environmental well-being
Internal red tape	−0.053	−0.152*	−0.193**	−0.104	−0.093	−0.136 ⁺	−0.364***	−0.109	0.030	−0.146 ⁺
Remove poor manager	−0.224*	−0.209**	−0.204**	−0.155	−0.037	−0.064	−0.021	−0.088	−0.036	−0.177*
Reward good manager	0.096	0.159*	0.148*	0.102	0.013	0.188**	0.217**	0.118	−0.074	0.233**
Reorganization	0.074	0.056	0.058	−0.049	−0.110	0.070	0.039	0.118	0.076	0.004
External red tape	0.196*	0.060	0.132 ⁺	0.109	−0.043	0.070	0.165 ⁺	0.087	−0.203**	0.095
<i>R</i> ² /Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.471/0.392	0.661/0.615	0.591/0.535	0.448/0.373	0.421/0.341	0.603/0.549	0.453/0.373	0.393/0.309	0.538/0.474	0.525/0.459
Chow <i>F</i> -test	2.05*	1.96*	2.96*	0.90	1.06	1.62 ⁺	2.49*	1.23	2.10*	2.72*

⁺*p* = .1, **p* = .05, ***p* = .01, ****p* = .001.

The two measures of resources are only associated with internal perceptions of performance, but different types of performance. Reducing resources is logically associated with value for money and efficiency. Resource constraints are related to the internal aggregate measure, quality, effectiveness, customer satisfaction, and social, economic, and environmental well-being. The measures of regulation are negatively and significantly related to internal and external measures of governmental performance. The role of inspectors has negative consequences for all dimensions of performance except equity and staff satisfaction, and direct intervention has similar effects, impacting all measures except value for money and social, economic and environmental well-being.

Of the external controls, all significant coefficients are in the anticipated direction with the exception of extent of need and diversity of need in relation to equity. Although it was hypothesized that all background variables were constraints on performance, it is plausible that managers may devote more time to serving disadvantaged groups in areas with high need and may therefore feel they are doing a good job in dealing with equity issues.¹⁵ The most consistent external constraint on performance is not the extent or change in need, but rather sheer diversity, which affects both internal and external measures of performance. These findings on the impact of the external environment on organizational performance are consistent with the range of argument and existing evidence on the topic (see, e.g., Meier et al. 2007; Pettigrew, Ferlie, and McKee 1997; Thompson 1967). Extant research evidence from the data set studied in this article has shown that external constraints can explain up to one-third of organizational performance (Andrews et al. 2005).

Red Tape

Red tape has consequences for internal and external measures of performance. For the external perceptual measure derived by local government's key stakeholder—the central government vis-à-vis the Audit Commission—the statistical relationships for the remove poor manager and external red tape measures are statistically significant. Internal red tape, reward good manager, and reorganization did not have any effect on performance. The inability to remove poor performers due to excessive red tape—the remove poor manager variable—was likely to reduce the performance of local governments. Furthermore, the direction of the coefficient for the external red tape measure is positive, suggesting that some degree of external red tape has a positive effect on performance. This suggests that the Audit Commission rewards authorities that place some degree of restriction on their openness and that interaction with an authority should possibly be regulated in some way. Perhaps, such buffering or gating helps to ward off environmental shocks and allows staff to focus more intently on core activities, thus improving performance.

For the internal perceptions of red tape, the picture is more complex. Different types of red tape have varying impacts on the several dimensions of performance. Of particular interest are the results for the first personnel subsystem measure: “the formal pay structures and rules make it hard to reward a good manager with higher pay here.” This item is positively and significantly related to five of the nine internal dimensions of performance. This is contrary to the anticipated results and, indeed, counterintuitive, conflicting with much of the literature on red tape and governmental performance. In the context of English local

15 The authors are grateful to one of the reviewers for suggesting this line of argument.

government, this finding suggests that rewarding managers with higher pay is not sufficient to produce higher levels of performance, and indeed, doing so is counterproductive for our aggregate internal perceptual measure of performance and for the extant measures of quality, effectiveness, equity, and social, economic and environmental well-being. It is possible to speculate about why this might be true.

For 40 years, mounting survey evidence has repeatedly shown that public employees are less motivated by extrinsic rewards such as pay increases and more motivated by intrinsic rewards such as the satisfaction derived from helping others and making a difference in society. (The reverse is generally true of private sector employees.) This difference in reward preferences is often associated with a “public service ethic,” “public service ethos,” or form of “public service motivation” (Brewer, Facer, and Selden 2000; Brewer and Selden 1998; Perry, 1996, 2000; Pratchett and Wingfield 1996). Thus, our findings suggest that other factors such as altruism, prosocial behavior, and public service motivation affect the types of rewards that staff are responsive to. The bottom line is that pay increases should not be handed out differentially and that pay for performance schemes tend to lower governmental performance (for reviews that echo and help explain this finding further, see Kellough and Lu 1993; Zeller 2004).

These explanations support the Blair government arguments that nonmaterial rewards are more important incentives for public sector workers than monetary rewards. These policy prescriptions seem more consistent with the behavior and expectations of public officials than pay for performance plans. The implications for the red tape debate are equally important. Our findings show that some forms of red tape have positive consequences, even though we have defined the term with strong negative connotations on the survey instrument. In other words, to the extent that red tape can help to neutralize or bury wrongheaded management reforms such as pay for performance, it may actually boost organizational performance.

None of the coefficients for the administrative subsystem measure of red tape achieved statistical significance, and only two of the coefficients were in the anticipated direction. Difficulties in reorganizing are expected to have negative impacts on many dimensions of performance—particularly those associated with responsiveness, but no such relationships were uncovered. Looking beyond the red tape literature, and drawing upon the model of public management specified by O’Toole and Meier (1999), English local government officers may respond to pressures for change by favoring stability rather than rapid change. A central aspect of the O’Toole-Meier thesis is the important role that managers play in ensuring organizational stability, and the positive consequences this can have for performance (O’Toole and Meier 1999).

The external red tape measure also produces limited results. This variable is negative and statistically significant on only one occasion—in relation to staff satisfaction. Interestingly, this is also the only red tape variable significant in the staff satisfaction model, suggesting that internal rules and regulations are not as important for this dimension of performance as placing limits on the ability of external stakeholders to interact with the organization. These findings resonate with the literature on communication and red tape that shows how communication can be an important factor in mediating the impact of red tape (Garnett et al. 2005). Even so, considering that the only statistically significant coefficient was for an internal process measure of performance, the overall pattern of these results suggests that external red tape does not have profound effects on the key dimensions of governmental performance.

The two remaining measures (internal red tape and remove poor manager) are statistically significant and in the anticipated direction six times. In relation to the aggregate perceptual measure of performance, both internal red tape and the remove poor manager measure are negative and statistically significant. Red tape in general and the inability to remove poorly performing managers is likely to reduce levels of governmental performance. The same pattern of results is reported in the quality model. Equity also reduces in the face of internal red tape. Indeed, this is the strongest and most significant of all the red tape coefficients. The final red tape measure that reaches statistical significance is the personnel subsystem measure of difficulty in removing poorly performing managers, which is negatively related to the social, economic, and environmental well-being performance dimension.

The red tape measures are not significant predictors of performance in three of our models, possibly because we are controlling for various aspects of management, resources, regulation, and the external context which could be suppressing or counteracting the impact of red tape. These models are predicting value for money, efficiency, and customer satisfaction. These findings (or perhaps we should say non-findings) are surprising given the likely impact of rules and regulations on performance. For example, efficiency is the relationship between inputs and outputs or, as was stated on the questionnaire, cost per unit of service delivery. We anticipated that internal red tape (on both the global measure and subsystem derivations) would have substantial impacts on the costs of service delivery, with burdensome rules and regulations driving up costs, particularly since internal measures of red tape affect other dimensions of performance. This could occur because the model is underspecified or the control variables offer a more persuasive explanation. Either way, additional research is needed to explain this provocative finding.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This article makes several contributions to the growing literature on public management research. First, we mount a good test of the red tape-performance hypothesis in the context of English local government, the setting in which the term red tape apparently originated in the 17th century. The results show that an aggregate measure of red tape reduces governmental performance as expected, but the relationship disappears when a full range of control variables are entered. Next, we examine relationships across the various dimensions of red tape and performance. The results show that red tape can have both positive and negative impacts on governmental performance but that these impacts are somewhat weaker and less pervasive than public management theory and conventional wisdom suggest. Given that no prior empirical research has examined the effects of red tape on such a broad range of performance measures, we conclude that the red tape myth may be somewhat overblown and that its potential impact on governmental performance may be slightly overestimated. At least, the impact is not always large and negative as the literature and anecdotal evidence suggest.

The various types of red tape seem to affect the several dimensions of governmental performance in some surprising ways. The desire for greater efficiency in government is one of the most compelling reasons for administrative reforms such as rule simplification and paperwork reduction. Yet our results show that red tape does not have any salient effects on efficiency in English local government. Similarly, the need for improved customer satisfaction often provides the impetus for administrative reforms such as

deregulation, increasing transparency, and improving customer access to government services. Yet red tape does not seem to have any appreciable impact on customer satisfaction in English local government. Surprisingly, red tape *does* have a substantial impact on equity. The results indicate that equity reduces in the face of internal red tape, and the coefficient is one of the strongest recorded in this study. This is at odds with conventional wisdom that would attribute the largest harmful effects of red tape on efficiency. Yet excessive rules, regulations, and procedures may create inequities and prevent fairness to citizens by restricting access and penalizing those less able to understand and overcome them. These findings are also provocative and beg further investigation.

Implications for stakeholder red tape

Most previous studies have focused on the concept of *organizational red tape*. A more compelling explanation of our findings may be found in an alternative concept known as *stakeholder red tape*. Bozeman (2000, 83) defines the term as: “a rule that remains in force and entails a compliance burden, but serves no objective valued by a given stakeholder group.” This echoes Waldo’s (1946, 369) observation that “one man’s red tape is another man’s system” and Kaufman’s (1977, 4) view that “one person’s red tape is another’s treasured safeguard.” In other words, a variation of Mile’s law may be operative in public organizations: various stakeholder groups may define red tape differently and hold different views about its causes and effects, in part because of their different stations in the governmental process.

In this study, we find that stakeholder perceptions are important. By employing internal and external measures of performance, as reported by staff and the Audit Commission, respectively, we have documented some variation in how these two stakeholder groups perceive the effects of red tape on their assessments of organizational performance. For instance, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between the Audit Commission’s CSP score and the item remove poor manager, while staff perceived a weaker relationship for many dimensions of performance (six did not achieve statistical significance). Similarly, there was no statistically significant relationship between CSP and internal red tape, but CSP was positively and significantly related to external red tape. Staff disagreed with the Audit Commission, apparently feeling that internal red tape was negatively related to performance but external red tape was not significantly related in most instances. Staff further felt the ability to reward good managers was positively related to performance, whereas the CSP model generated a much weaker and nonsignificant relationship. Overall, these two stakeholder groups held dissimilar views about the items discussed above, and their views did not converge elsewhere. These differences are predictable as a function of Mile’s law, and they tend to support the notion of stakeholder red tape. The Audit Commission is a watchdog group that operates on the perimeter of public organizations. The Commission has argued that internal constraints are more important than external constraints and has suggested that the external environment does not affect organizational performance (see Andrews et al. 2005). The Audit Commission believes that local authorities are in control of their own destinies and holds them accountable for results. In contrast, local public managers feel like pawns in a chess game: they have limited range of movement and less chance of exerting decisive impact compared with other actors. As a result, local public managers tend to view external constraints as more

important influences on outcomes than internal constraints. Their view is consistent with Bozeman's (2000) contention that external controls cause red tape to proliferate.

In essence, the Audit Commission and local government managers may hold different views on red tape's effects because they hold different positions in the governmental process and therefore have different perspectives. The results suggest that each party may be constructing a reality about red tape that is consistent with their own self-interest. Both tend to avoid culpability for generating red tape and, instead, place blame on the other party—or at least suggest that red tape is emanating from the other party's domain. The Audit Commission, for example, may overlook the adverse impact of regulations and procedures that it imposes but sees the real problem as occurring at the local government level. Local government managers, on the other hand, may blame externally imposed red tape (such as that imposed by the Audit Commission) which is beyond their control and responsibility.¹⁶ To investigate these possibilities, researchers will have to collect data on perceptions of red tape and performance among the key stakeholder groups.

If stakeholders are central to the study of public management problems, and we believe they are, there is some urgency in unpacking and exploring the concept of stakeholder red tape. Accordingly, we believe another contribution of this study is that it shows stakeholder red tape can be operationalized (if rather simply in this article) and used to inform future debate in research and practice. Further research should try to expand the number of stakeholder groups surveyed to see if there is similar variation in the perceived impact of red tape on performance as has been recorded here. Furthermore, it would be useful to know which stakeholder groups view a specific rule or regulation as burdensome and why. Policymakers might then have a clearer sense of whether certain rules and regulations are needed or whether they should be eliminated.

By reconceptualizing red tape as a subject-dependent concept, we can further clarify the varying relationships between different types of red tape and the various dimensions of governmental performance. Internal red tape, judged by internal stakeholders, tends to lower governmental performance most of the time, but not on efficiency—one of the most strongly expected relationships. Conversely, external red tape does not lower governmental performance on customer satisfaction or value for money—which are expected relationships—but actually increases performance on some other dimensions such as quality and equity. One of our most interesting findings is that the ability to reward a good manager, which is a personnel subsystem measure of red tape, consistently lowers governmental performance. The reasons for this finding are not altogether clear, but it appears that differential pay for public managers (and possibly other employees) creates dissension and takes a heavy toll on governmental performance—a finding that is consistent with the public management literatures on public service motivation and pay for performance but which runs counter to conventional wisdom and management practice.

Further research

We tender these conclusions gingerly because more research is clearly needed. Yet our findings on the varying relationships between different types of red tape and the several dimensions of governmental performance are rich and deserve more attention. Almost every relationship (or lack thereof) has important implications for public management

¹⁶ The authors are grateful to two reviewers who suggested this interpretation of the findings.

research and practice. Some of these findings suggest that conventional wisdom about the nature and effects of red tape—and specifically its relationship with governmental performance—may need rethinking. In particular, a concerted research effort should be directed toward examining stakeholder red tape. Some questions that need to be explored include: how do different groups of stakeholders view red tape and do their perceptions of the antecedents and consequences of red tape vary? (For starters, see Walker and Brewer 2008.) The same questions apply to public agencies with different purposes and functions, raising additional questions about whether interagency differences could explain observed variations in red tape (see Brewer and Walker, forthcoming). If red tape is shown to be more a subject-dependent than an organizational construct, researchers will need to revisit existing studies on red tape and also consider the implications of this fundamental reconceptualization for public management research and practice.

This study's strongest conclusion for public management research is that relationships between management and performance are likely to be influenced by a range of factors. These findings comport with growing evidence in the public management literature that organizational performance is contingent on a number of important variables including management and organizational context (Meier et al. 2007; O'Toole and Meier 1999; Pandey and Moynihan 2006). Stakeholder red tape is clearly a contingent concept, and our findings thus add to this emerging literature. More research, enhanced measurement, and better data are required to more completely explore what contingencies matter for different types of organizations. Some of these contingencies will include management, organization, and circumstantial variables but could extend to internal stakeholders—for example, different types of services with different missions and groups of staff may hold different conceptions of the way in which red tape is generated (see, e.g., Brewer and Walker, forthcoming; Coursey and Pandey 2007; Walker and Brewer 2008).

For practice, these conclusions once again confirm that “one-size-fits-all” reforms typically introduced and adopted by governments everywhere are unlikely to achieve the desired results. Such reforms are often based on oversimplifications of complex, dynamic processes that can be very hard to improve in the real world—especially without greater understanding and more surgical intervention. For public managers, the implications are more daunting: different types of red tape have varying impacts on governmental performance, and these impacts range across the full spectrum of possibilities (from negative to positive). This means that public managers must develop a keen and properly nuanced understanding of how red tape affects governmental performance and learn to manage the resulting contingencies to good effect.

Limitations

We acknowledge the partially cross-sectional nature of our data, which limits our ability to make causal attributions. We did introduce a near year-long time lag between our independent variables (measures of management, constraints, and red tape) and the dependent variable in the CSP model, but we are not sure whether this is the correct time lag for red tape to fully exert its potential impact on governmental performance. Also, we are modeling the impact of red tape on performance as predicted in the literature, but we cannot be certain that the relationship is one-way. We cannot, for example, rule out the possibility that performance affects red tape. The relationship may be bidirectional with lower performing governments generating more red tape and higher performing governments creating less

red tape, or at least they may be able to clear it away more efficiently. If this is the case, we might anticipate that the freedoms given under the CPA regime to higher performing authorities would allow them to escape from the shackles of red tape, whereas weak authorities are left to drown in it. If true, this “creaming effect” would tend to undermine current practice. We also acknowledge limitations in the external validity of our study. English local government authorities are relatively large, multiplex organizations. Results at the agency or service level, or in other national settings, might be different. In addition, we have not examined any interactive effects between management, red tape, and other important variables that may affect governmental performance. Future research should investigate these interactive effects and seek to further expand and clarify our knowledge about the red tape concept.

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APPENDIX

Table A1
Labels, Measures, and Descriptive Data

Label	Measure	Mean	SD
Performance measures			
CSP		71.768	6.737
Aggregated perceptual performance		0.000	1
Quality (e.g., how quick/responsively services are delivered)		3.080	0.369
Value for money		3.135	0.365
Efficiency (e.g., cost per unit of service delivery)		2.982	0.361
Effectiveness (e.g., whether your objectives were achieved)		3.138	0.371
Equity (e.g., how fairly your services are distributed among citizens)			
Customer satisfaction		3.042	0.355
Staff satisfaction		2.859	0.301
Social economic and environmental well-being		2.986	0.329
Red Tape			
Internal red tape	The level of red tape in our service/authority is high	4.157	0.750
Remove poor manager	Even if a manager is a poor performer, formal rules make it hard to remove him or her from the organization	4.542	0.898

Continued

Table A1 (*continued*)
Labels, Measures, and Descriptive Data

Label	Measure	Mean	SD
Reward good manager	The formal pay structures and rules make it hard to reward a good manager with higher pay here	5.329	0.885
Reorganization	Reorganizing an organizational unit or department can be achieved within 2 or 3 weeks in our service/ authority	4.986	0.700
External red tape	Administrative rules and procedures are open and responsive allowing stakeholders (users, businesses, government agencies, etc.) to freely interact with our service/ authority	3.072	0.707
Internal and external controls			
Formalization	Written policies and procedures are important in guiding the action of employees in the service	5.216	0.517
Developmental culture	The service/authority is prepared to take risks; The service/authority is at the forefront of innovative approaches (eigenvalue 1.683, 86.34%)	10.278	1.363
Rational planning	When the service formulates strategy, it is planned in detail; when the service formulates strategy, options are identified and evaluated before the best option is selected; Strategy is made in consultation with our external stakeholders (e.g., users, other agencies, etc.) (Eigenvalue 2.413, 34.47%)	0.000	1
Logical incrementalism	The strategy with the greatest political support is usually adopted as our policy; when we make strategy, we produce policy options which are very similar to those we already have; strategy develops through an ongoing process of adjustment; when we make strategy, we produce broad goals; strategy develops through a process of bargaining and negotiation between groups or individuals (eigenvalue 1.620, 23.14%)	0.000	1
Reducing costs	Reducing the costs of service delivery was a major part of our approach	5.146	0.750

Continued

Table A1 (*continued*)
Labels, Measures, and Descriptive Data

Label	Measure	Mean	SD
Resource constraints	Resource constraints were important in driving improvement in our service/authority	4.786	0.758
Regulation	Inspectors' reports were important in driving improvement in our service/authority	5.191	0.849
Direct intervention	Direct intervention from central government was important in driving performance in our service/authority	2.654	1.085
Service need	Percentage loan parent households	26.409	10.836
Diversity of need	Herfindahl-Hirschman index of ethnic diversity	2488.309	2137.990
Change in need	Change in population 1991–2001	0.685	0.732
Ability to influence context	The service was/is able to exert a lot of influence over the social and economic context during the last year, external political context during the last year, and internal political context during the last year (eigenvalue 1.877, 62.58%)	0.000	1
<i>N</i>		136	

Note: Promoting the social, economic, and environmental well-being of local people is a measure of public sector sustainability that builds upon the triple bottom-line used in the business sector (see Enticott and Walker 2008).

Table A2
Correlation Matrix of the Performance Measures

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Quality									
2. Value for money	0.58								
3. Efficiency	0.57	0.80							
4. Effectiveness	0.67	0.37	0.47						
5. Equity	0.28	0.07	0.10	0.35					
6. Customer satisfaction	0.57	0.45	0.44	0.55	0.11				
7. Staff satisfaction	0.54	0.44	0.46	0.49	0.15	0.52			
8. Social, economic, and environmental well-being	0.47	0.41	0.38	0.57	0.33	0.50	0.41		
9. Aggregate perceptual	0.83	0.74	0.75	0.79	0.41	0.74	0.70	0.71	
10. CSP	0.62	0.42	0.42	0.57	0.20	0.45	0.36	0.46	0.62

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