Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Advance Access originally published online on July 16, 2007
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 2008 18(2):275-295; doi:10.1093/jopart/mum011
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The Costs of Speaking Truth to Power: How Professionalism Facilitates Credible Communication
Washington University in St. Louis
Address correspondence to the author at jmtonon{at}yahoo.com.
This article examines how information or policy analysis can be credibly communicated between the bureaucracy and Congress. To investigate this issue, I develop a signaling model which shows that under certain circumstances—specifically when professionalized bureaucrats can impose observable costs on themselves that their politically inclined counterparts are unwilling to incur—credible communication between the bureaucracy and Congress is possible. A contribution of this article is that it provides a theoretical underpinning for the importance of professionalism and neutral competence in the bureaucracy as a means of promoting good governance.
A promise underlies public policy: if the actions we recommend are undertaken, good ... consequences rather than bad ... ones actually will come about. (Wildavsky 1979, 35)The "political master" finds himself in the position of the "dilettante" who stands opposite the "expert," facing the trained official who stands within the management of administration. (Weber, as quoted in Gerth and Mills 1958, 232).
For their gracious support and incisive comments, the author would like to thank Gary Miller and Marc Law. This paper was completed while the author was visiting the Department of Political Science.