Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Advance Access originally published online on February 26, 2007
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 2008 18(1):33-55; doi:10.1093/jopart/mum003
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Political Control and Bureaucratic Autonomy Revisited: A Multi-Institutional Analysis of OSHA Enforcement
University of Seoul
Address correspondence to the author at kimd{at}uos.ac.kr.
The proper role of bureaucracy in democratic governance has long been a matter of controversy. One part of the debate involves the argument that democratic control and bureaucratic autonomy are dichotomous opposites: if there is democratic control, there cannot be bureaucratic autonomy, and vice versa. This article develops a spatial model of bureaucratic policy choices that reveals that conditions of democratic control and bureaucratic autonomy are not incompatible: the interactions among political institutions not only create the condition in which government agencies must respond to the will of the elected officials but also provide the opportunity for the agencies to reflect their own preferences in policy outcomes. Empirical analyses of occupational safety and health enforcement between 1982 and 2000 provide support for the general argument that bureaucratic responsiveness and bureaucratic autonomy together constitute the behavioral characteristics of bureaucracy under institutional influence.