Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Advance Access originally published online on December 16, 2004
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 2006 16(1):45-65; doi:10.1093/jopart/mui024
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Incentives, Capacity, and Implementation: Evidence from Massachusetts Education Reform
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Address correspondence to the author at mcdermott{at}educ.umass.edu
Since the 1980s, most of the states and the U.S. federal government have enacted policies based upon the theory of standards-based education reform. These policies attempt to use incentives to overcome the difficulty of implementing policy in a loosely coupled system. This article presents a case study of the implementation of standards-based reform in Massachusetts. The case study shows how poorly thought-out incentive structures, lack of capacity, and lack of trust impeded implementation of the reforms. The Massachusetts experience has implications for the education reform movement nationwide, because Massachusetts has been a leader in the movement. Analysis of the Massachusetts case also contributes to the literature on how context affects policy implementation.