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Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Advance Access published online on June 10, 2009

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, doi:10.1093/jopart/mup011
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal Rule-making "Ossified"?

Jason Webb Yackee

University of Wisconsin Law School

Susan Webb Yackee

University of Wisconsin

Address correspondence to the author at yackee{at}wisc.edu.

We provide the first empirical assessment of the ossification thesis, the widely accepted notion that procedural constraints on federal agencies have greatly hindered the ability of those agencies to formulate policy through notice and comment rule-making. Using data that cover all active federal rule-writing agencies from 1983 to 2006, our results largely disconfirm the ossification thesis. Agencies appear readily able to issue a sizeable number of rules and to do so relatively quickly. Indeed, our empirical results suggest that procedural constraints may actually speed up the promulgation of rules, though our model suggests that this positive effect may decline, or even reverse, as proposed rules age. We conclude that procedural constraints do not appear to unduly interfere with the ability of federal agencies to act, or in most cases, to act in a timely manner.


An earlier version of this article was the 2008 winner of the "Best Paper by an Emerging Scholar(s)" Award at the Midwest Political Science Conference.


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