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Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 8, No. 2: 173-202 (1998)
© 1998 Public Management Research Association


research-article

Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?

Richard W. Waterman1 and Kenneth J. Meier2

1University of New Mexico
2Texas A&M University

Principal-agent models have been the basis for an extensive set of studies relating bureaucracy to elected officials. Yet despite the outpouring of research, there has been little attempt to test the basic assumptions of the principal-agent model. The model makes two assumptions: that goal conflict exists between principals and agents and that agents have more information than their principals, which results in an information asymmetry between them. But how valid are these assumptions? Can instances be found in which these assumptions do not hold? What happens when we vary these assumptions? In this article, we present both a critique of the traditional principal-agent model and a presentation of a broader theoretical framework for conceptualizing bureaucratic politics.


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