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Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Advance Access originally published online on December 3, 2008
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 2009 19(4):853-871; doi:10.1093/jopart/mun024
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© The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

The Strategic Games that Donors and Bureaucrats Play: An Institutional Rational Choice Analysis

Eduardo Araral

National University of Singapore

Address correspondence to the author at sppaej{at}nus.edu.sg.

Foreign aid plays an important role in developing countries, but little is empirically known how it affects incentives of recipient bureaucracies. I provide a model and analytic case study to understand the strategic games that donors and bureaucrats play. My findings are broadly consistent with the theoretical expectations of institutional rational choice: bureaucrats attempt to ensure bureaucratic survival, whereas donors ensure growth of loan portfolio. These findings, however, are not consistent with the Samaritan's Dilemma and the Patron's Dilemma.


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