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Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Advance Access originally published online on July 24, 2008
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 2009 19(3):579-602; doi:10.1093/jopart/mun014
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© The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

A Political Consequence of Contracting: Organized Interests and State Agency Decision Making

Christine A. Kelleher

Villanova University

Susan Webb Yackee

The University of Wisconsin at Madison

Address correspondence to the author at christine.kelleher{at}villanova.edu.

We argue that contracting opens a pathway for organized interests to lobby public managers. Using multilevel modeling techniques, we test this proposition with data from administrative agencies in the American states. We find that interactions between organized interests and managers increase in the presence of contracting. We then demonstrate that the influence of organized interests over key state agency decision making is driven, in part, by whether an agency contracts out for public service delivery. The findings suggest the presence of an alternate pathway for organized interests to access and influence government decision makers. Moreover, these results complement previous studies, which primarily highlight the potential economic benefits of contracting and hold important normative implications for our understanding of government responsiveness in an era of decentralized governance.


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