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Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Advance Access originally published online on December 11, 2006
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 2007 17(2):335-356; doi:10.1093/jopart/mul019
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© The Author 2006. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

The Unintended Effects of Private School Competition

Simon Calmar Andersen

University of Aarhus

Søren Serritzlew

University of Aarhus

Address correspondence to the authors at simon{at}ps.au.dk or soren{at}ps.au.dk.

We examine whether competition from private schools improves public school performance and expenditure. It is difficult methodologically to isolate the effect of competition, but we use new measures of competition in both the public and the private school sector and a data set comprising detailed background information on more than 35,000 public school students in the Danish voucher system. This design provides a relatively firm support for the conclusion that competition does not improve achievement of public school students but that it increases public expenditure per student. Finally, we argue that there may be several good reasons for this.

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Nordic Political Science Association conference, August 11–13, 2005, Reykjavik. We would like to thank the participants as well as Jens Blom-Hansen, Jørgen Grønnegård Christensen, Asbjørn Sonne Nørgaard, Thomas Pallesen, and three anonymous referees for their very helpful comments.


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